REASONING, DECISION-MAKING AND RATIONALITY

被引:79
|
作者
EVANS, JSBT
OVER, DE
MANKTELOW, KI
机构
[1] UNIV SUNDERLAND,SCH SOCIAL & INT STUDIES,SUNDERLAND SR1 3SD,ENGLAND
[2] UNIV WOLVERHAMPTON,SCH HLTH SCI,WOLVERHAMPTON WV1 1DJ,ENGLAND
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0010-0277(93)90039-X
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
It is argued that reasoning in the real world supports decision making and is aimed at the achievement of goals. A distinction is developed between two notions of rationality: rationality1 which is reasoning in such a way as to achieve one's goals - within cognitive constraints - and rationality2 which is reasoning by a process of logic. This dichotomy is related to the philosophical distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. It is argued that logicality (rationality2) does not provide a good basis for rationality1 and some psychological research on deductive reasoning is re-examined in this light. First, we review belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning, and argue that the phenomena do not support the interpretations of irrationality that are often placed upon them. Second, we review and discuss recent studies of deontic reasoning in the Wason selection task, which demonstrate the decision making, and rational1 nature of reasoning in realistic contexts. The final section of the paper examines contemporary decision theory and shows how it fails, in comparable manner to formal logic, to provide an adequate model for assessing the rationality of human reasoning and decision making.
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页码:165 / 187
页数:23
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