DOES MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AFFECT DEBT MATURITY IN CHILEAN FIRMS? AN AGENCY COST AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION APPROACH

被引:6
|
作者
Munoz Mendoza, Jorge Andres [1 ]
Sepulveda Yelpo, Sandra Maria [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Concepcion, Dept Business Management, Concepcion, Chile
来源
ECOS DE ECONOMIA | 2016年 / 20卷 / 43期
关键词
Debt maturity; agency costs; ownership structure; managerial discretion; monitoring;
D O I
10.17230/ecos.2016.43.4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We address debt maturity determinants for Chilean firms using data whose information was drawn from the Longitudinal Survey of Companies (ELE). Results from pooled Tobit regressions indicate that for firms with high growth opportunities, managerial discretion will encourage longer debt terms, a decision that contributes to reducing liquidity risk. For firms with low growth opportunities, managerial discretion does not affect debt maturity, while external monitoring reduces it. These results provide new evidence for international literature. Other conclusions suggest that debt maturity is positively related to firm size, capital structure, and asset tangibility and negatively related to agency costs and belonging to business holdings. These findings support international studies.
引用
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页码:65 / 87
页数:23
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