OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, HUMAN CAPITAL AND VOTING

被引:0
|
作者
Menard, Sebastien [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Quebec Montreal, CIRPEE, CP8888,Succ Ctr Ville, Montreal, PQ H3C 3P8, Canada
来源
REVUE ECONOMIQUE | 2007年 / 58卷 / 03期
关键词
Classification JEL; D72; J24; J65;
D O I
10.3917/reco.583.0703
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines the characteristics of the unemployment insurance when the human capital decreases throughout the unemployment spell. We consider three instruments of economic policy: the replacement ratio, the duration of UI benefits and the level of minimum benefits. We show that the optimal UI is characterized by (i) a high replacement ratio, (ii) a short duration of UI benefits and (iii) low duration benefits. However, the politico-economic equilibrium leads to increase the duration of benefits.
引用
收藏
页码:703 / 712
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条