Dirty hands or dirty decisions? Investigating, prosecuting and punishing those responsible for abuses of detainees in counter terrorism operations

It is well established that in response to the events of 11 September 2001, the US routinely and systematically used torture and other forms of ill-treatment against terrorist suspects and that this was authorised at the highest levels of the Bush administration. The authors of that policy have vociferously defended the use of so called enhanced interrogation techniques with dirty hands justifications. Cheney, for instance, has aggressively defended the necessity of 'tough, mean, dirty, nasty tactics' to keep the country safe and this is mirrored in academic justifications for torture as dirty hands decisions in extreme circumstances. This article will: (1) dispute that the use of torture and ill-treatment were genuine cases of dirty hands; and (2) even if they were, it is a feature of dirty hands justifications that there is focus on the abiding wrong of the necessary evil and punishment is necessary to acknowledge the wrong that has been done. In the light of this, it will be argued that those who ordered, designed and applied the policy should be held to account in criminal investigations or in some appropriate socially sanctioned proceedings.