Share incentive schemes for Chief Audit Executives

被引:0
|
作者
Peter, M. [1 ]
Steyn, B. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pretoria, Dept Auditing, Pretoria, South Africa
关键词
Chief Audit Executive; objectivity and independence; share incentive schemes; incentives; internal auditors;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The use of share incentive schemes as part of the remuneration structure for the head of internal audit or the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is one mechanism available to a company to incentivise its senior executives and to ensure they add value to the company they manage. This can however lead to challenges as internal auditors have always had to fulfil two contradictory roles: being an employee in a company and being an objective person involved in rendering independent assurance services for the same company. It is, therefore, important for internal auditors to strike the correct balance that ensures they are perceived as sufficiently independent to achieve their objectives in terms of the annual internal audit plan. Care must also be taken to ensure that the share incentives do not have a negative influence on the level (or perceived level) of independence and objectivity the CAE demonstrates. This is the first South African study to investigate the use of share incentive schemes for CAEs. This study used structured interviews in a multiple case study approach to identify the views of the chairpersons of audit committees (CACs) on the use of share incentive schemes for their CAEs. The study found that share incentive schemes were used to incentivise CAEs mostly over the medium term. The study also found that although the CACs had little oversight over the remuneration of the CAEs, they nevertheless did consider the use of share incentive schemes to be an acceptable remuneration mechanism.
引用
收藏
页码:131 / 144
页数:14
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