THE REPRESENTATIONAL VIEW OF MIND IN PERSPECTIVE - A RESPONSE

This is a response to a comment by Lucas (1991) on Shanon (1988), which argued against the characterization of semantics and semantic processing by means of underlying semantic representations. Following comments by Lucas, this response focuses on 3 issues. First, the notion of context is examined; it is argued that the very definition of this notion already underlines the problematic nature of the representational framework. Second, following a series of properties and desiderata that Lucas presents, a general look is taken in which 2 pictures of mind - the representational and the nonrepresentational - are contrasted. Third, focusing on some analogies to biology, a few methodological comments are made. The gist of this response is that regardless of details, the basic outlook on the mind assumed by the representational paradigm is inadequate; hence, alternative theoretical foundations for cognition should be explored.