Inquiry into the nature of interactions between rural societies and guerrillas is now a central concern of scholars studying southern Africa. This case study, which focuses on the Katerere chiefdom of northern Nyanga district Zimbabwe, analyses the interaction of local politics with guerrilla strategies of mobilisation during the country's war of liberation, 1976-1980. It argues that peasant agendas were more salient than guerrilla ideology, which was essentially weak. In order to achieve the widest possible legitimacy, guerrillas worked out locally specific strategies which varied according to gender, generation, ethnicity, social stratification and geographical location. Because peasant ideologies and interests often conflicted, guerrilla strategy changed as different social categories won and lost political ascendancy. Moreover patterns of guerrilla peasant interaction cannot be explained by disaggregating rural society alone. The guerrilla armies themselves must be differentiated. The weakness of guerrilla ideology and their diminishing concern to have political legitimacy meant that guerrillas failed to institute a political programme which would bring about concrete change in the structures of rural society. The paper ends with a consideration of what modifications the case study suggests to the existing historiography of the liberation war.