PARTY COMPETITION IN AN ETHNIC DUAL PARTY SYSTEM

Combining material from theories of segmented societies and of party competition this article examines Northern Ireland's ethnic party system. The first section focuses on political segmentation and the defensive character of party competition. In segmented societies multi-ethnic parties or alliances are typically unstable and are often replaced by parties projecting an exclusive ethnic appeal. Since ethnic parties appeal solely to one ethnic group elections are more about 'mobilizing the faithful' than competing for uncommitted voters. Indeed, since there are so few uncommitted voters turnout becomes a critical variable. A highly ideological and inflammatory language of appeal is often the easiest way of mobilizing apathetic partisans so that there is no premium on moderation. Electoral competition becomes almost entirely defensive, reinforcing divisions at the mass level and providing relatively secure positions for leaders. The second section considers the implications for conflict regulation of the competitive dynamic which leads to an intra-segmental politics of ethnic outbidding. It is argued that control of the segments and the ability to cooperate inter-segmentally are closely interdependent variables. Different types of competitive strategy in the Northern Ireland party system are then analysed. Finally, the article examines recent changes in the Northern Ireland party system, focusing on alliance strategies and attempts to protect 'moderate' parties from flanking by more extreme rivals. Failure to 'insulate' moderate parties from the centrifugal pulls of their more extreme rivals eventually led to important changes in the policies of the British and Irish governments.