SOPHISTICATED VOTING UNDER THE PLURALITY PROCEDURE - A TEST OF A NEW DEFINITION

被引：10

|

作者：

NIEMI, RG

FRANK, AQ

机构：

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 1985年 / 19卷 / 02期

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D O I：

10.1007/BF00132440

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

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页码：151 / 162

页数：12

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