ON REPEATED GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：65

|

作者：

SORIN, S

机构：

来源：

MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 1986年 / 11卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1287/moor.11.1.147

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：147 / 160

页数：14

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