On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts

被引：11
|
作者：
Kopel, Michael [1 ]
Lambertini, Luca [2 ]
机构：
[1] Karl Franzens Univ Graz, Inst Org & Econ Inst, Univ Str 15-E4, A-8010 Graz, Austria
[2] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, Bologna, Italy
来源：
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 34卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1002/mde.2572
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand systemused in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn, whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme a la Fershtman and Judd (1987). Copyright (C) 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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页码：40 / 43
页数：4
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