This article is a study of European Political Cooperation in the case of the Yugoslav crisis, from the outbreak of hostilities in the summer of 1991 to the end of 1992. EC policy in Yugoslavia was characterised by a high profile and ambitions to fill two different roles: the role as a peace broker and also a more interventionist role. The article analyses the difficulties involved in combining these roles, and the discrepancy between EC ambitions and the political skills and means available. One important characteristic of the Community's involvement in the Yugoslav conflict, was its active role in the early stages of conflict resolution. The EC immediately assumed the leading role in the peace process, supported by the international community at large. The EC peace conference did not achieve its aims in terms of peace making, partially because the principle of territorial integrity was replaced by that of self-determination, partially because the EC was not up to the task of negotiating ceasefires. Given the absence of a security dimension to EPC covering also military aspects, the role of the EC in peace keeping or other forms of military involvement was limited. This also in part explains why the UN assumed a more prominent role as the conflict changed character. Judged on its own terms, the interventionist role was more successful, although it served to undermine the role as neutral broker. The strength of the Community was its economic leverage over Yugoslavia, which it might have utilised more effectively at an earlier stage. The requirement of unanimity in EPC blocked the recognition of Macedonia, which served to undermine the credibility of EC policy. In the case of Croatia and Slovenia, however, EC member states fell into line with the German view on recognition. The intergovernmental conference on political union, which defined a common foreign and security policy, gave impetus to the foreign policy actions of the EC in Yugoslavia.
