CORE IMPLEMENTATION AND INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE FOR COOPERATION

被引:18
|
作者
MOLDOVANU, B
WINTER, E
机构
[1] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM, DEPT ECON, IL-91904 JERUSALEM, ISRAEL
[2] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM, CTR RATIONAL & INTERACT DECIS THEORY, IL-91904 JERUSALEM, ISRAEL
关键词
NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING; CORE IMPLEMENTATION;
D O I
10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.
引用
收藏
页码:533 / 548
页数:16
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