Efficiency in the cake-eating problem with quasi-geometric discounting

被引：0
|
作者：
Chavez -Martin del Campo, Juan Carlos [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Guanajuato, Guanajuato Sch Econ, Guanajuato, Mexico
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2007年 / 4卷
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper shows that any equilibrium allocation in the cake-eating problem with quasi-geometric discounting is not Pareto efficient. However, efficiency can be established by introducing a planner who controls the initial endowment and makes transfers over time. It is shown than any Pareto efficient allocation can be supported by a perfect equilibrium with transfers.
引用
收藏
页数：8
相关论文
共 32 条
1234