When sanctions can work: Economic sanctions and the theory of moves

The paradox of economic sanctions is that though they are used with increasing frequency in the post-cold war world, policy makers and scholars still largely conclude that they do not work to produce political change in targeted countries. This paper uses Steven Brams' revision of standard game theory, the ''theory of moves,'' to derive conditions for successful sanctions, failed sanctions, and stalemated sanctions disputes. Then, applying the theory of moves to the cases of U.S. sanctions against Vietnam and Haiti, it illustrates how Brams' theory can explain the dynamics and outcome of sanctions disputes. The paper shows that even if the recipient state has a dominant strategy of noncompliance with the sanctioning state, sanctions can succeed-even when they are costly to the sanctioning state. Further, it demonstrates that the theory of moves provides a better conceptual account of the dynamics of sanctions disputes over time than traditional game theory.