Firms' symmetry and sustainability of collusion in a Hotelling duopoly

被引：0
|
作者：
Colombo, Stefano [1 ]
机构：
[1] Catholic Univ MIlan, DEFAP, Milan, Italy
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2009年 / 29卷 / 01期
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D O I：
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中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We use a differentiated duopoly a la Hotelling to assess the impact of firms' symmetry on the sustainability of a tacit collusive agreement. We obtain that the smaller firm has the greater incentive to deviate and that symmetry helps collusion for any possible differentiation degree.
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页数：9
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