Classical Islamic law apparently constitutes an exception to the finding that legal systems in complex societies invariably possess hierarchical appellate structures. The prevailing wisdom among Islamicists for over a half-century has asserted that there are no appellate structures in Islamic law, that the decision of a judge is final and irrevocable, and that a judgment may not be reversed under any circumstances. The exceptional nature of Islamic law has been explained by Martin Shapiro as a function of the absence of hierarchy in the Islamic religious community. In this article, I argue that Shapiro has been poorly served by Islamicist scholarship. On the basis of a reexamination of Islamic legal theory and an analysis of 14th-century Islamic court practice, I demonstrate that a judicial decision was reversible by the issuing judge himself, albeit under limited and precisely defined conditions; that hierarchical organization was a regular feature of Muslim polities, that the court of the chief judge of the capital city served as a court of review for the decisions of local judges; and that Islamic law also developed a unique, nonhierarchical system of successor review. My conclusions will be of interest both to Islamicists and to social scientists who study the relationship between judicial institutions and social organization.