Misreporting Nonprofit Lobbying Engagement and Expenses: Charitable Regulation and Managerial Discretion

被引:8
|
作者
Prentice, Christopher R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ North Carolina Wilmington, Publ & Int Affairs, 601 S Coll Rd, Wilmington, NC 28403 USA
关键词
nonprofit lobbying; charitable regulation; nonprofit law; Form; 990; expense misreporting;
D O I
10.1515/npf-2018-0018
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
On the one hand, nonprofits are expected to protect values, promote ideals, and effect change, and on the other hand, they are normatively and legally discouraged from engaging in advocacy and lobbying. These countervailing forces produce a tension that nonprofit managers must navigate. Although previous research suggests that normative boundaries and legal implications constrain lobbying efforts, it is possible that these factors merely influence how some charities report their lobbying activities to authorities. Indeed, incentives to misreport lobbying engagement exist at the federal level where regulatory oversight is lax. This article compares state data obtained for a sample of charities to contemporaneous federal data regarding the lobbying engagement, payments, and expenses of these organizations and their registered lobbyists. Findings demonstrate that roughly half of the charities sampled engage in more lobbying than they report to federal authorities, lending support to the premise that managerial discretion influences nonprofit reporting.
引用
收藏
页数:13
相关论文
共 11 条