STRATEGIC TRANSFERS AND PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC-GOODS

被引:47
|
作者
BUCHHOLZ, W
KONRAD, KA
机构
[1] FREE UNIV BERLIN,DEPT ECON,D-14195 BERLIN,GERMANY
[2] UNIV BERGEN,N-5007 BERGEN,NORWAY
关键词
PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS; VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS;
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(95)80008-W
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good. If the agents differ in their contribution productivity, then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent. Although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game, the less productive agent becomes a Stackelberg leader. Furthermore, the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization.
引用
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页码:489 / 505
页数:17
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