Getting away with mass murder

被引:3
|
作者
Bellamy, Alex J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Griffith Univ, Ctr Governance & Publ Policy, Int Secur Griffith Asia Inst, Nathan, Qld, Australia
关键词
D O I
10.1080/14623528.2012.649894
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Despite the enormous attention paid to preventing mass atrocities and holding the perpetrators to account, new cases of mass killing remain as likely to end with outright victory for the perpetrators as with their defeat and punishment. Perpetrators of mass killing are often very well aware of the fact that their behaviour risks attracting adverse foreign intervention and other forms of punishment. To mitigate these risks, they employ strategies designed to conceal the reality of what they are doing, create uncertainty about responsibility for atrocities, establish their own credentials as the most legitimate partner in the affected area, and prevent the emergence of international consensus on punishment or intervention. This article examines some of the chief strategies employed by perpetrators.
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页码:29 / 53
页数:25
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