BORROWING BEHAVIOR OF THE PROPRIETARY FIRM - DO SOME RISK-AVERSE EXPECTED UTILITY MAXIMIZERS PLUNGE

被引：0

作者：

COLLINS, RA ^{[1
]}

GBUR, EE ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ARKANSAS,AGR STAT LAB,FAYETTEVILLE,AR 72701

来源：

WESTERN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS | 1991年 / 16卷 / 02期

关键词：

DEBT; FINANCE; RISK;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F3 [农业经济];

学科分类号：

0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;

摘要：

When a proprietor's liability is limited, borrowing behavior for an expected utility maximizer may vary widely. Proprietors with little to lose may rationally choose very large debt levels while others may choose to finance with 100% equity. This article presents a theory to explain these widely observed variations in behavior.

引用

页码：251 / 258

页数：8

共 5 条

[1] A test for risk-averse expected utility
Chambers, Christopher P.
Liu, Ce
Martinez, Seung-Keun
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2016, 163 : 775 - 785
[2] RELAXING THE EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS AND ENTRY EXIT DECISIONS OF THE RISK-AVERSE FIRM
FINKELSHTAIN, I
HEWITT, JA
[J]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1990, 72 (05) : 1349 - 1349
[3] A simple axiomatization of risk-averse expected utility
Werner, J
[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2005, 88 (01) : 73 - 77
[4] Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility
Schulhofer-Wohl, Sam
[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2006, 92 (03) : 383 - 388
[5] Further examples of the impact of skewness on the expected utility of a risk-averse agent
Peel, D. A.
[J]. APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2012, 19 (12) : 1117 - 1121

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