Why Cognitivists About Practical Reason can Only be Semi-Cognitivists

Debates about the nature and the role of rationality are part of the core of philosophy of economics. Holding rational beliefs and being instrumentally rational are some of the primary desiderata that economic theory demands when modelling the behavior of an agent. Philosophy itself, and especially philosophy of action, has also explored analogous issues and can certainly provide substantial insights about the nature of practical rationality. An agent is demanded to hold rational belief about the world: theoretical rationality requires the agent to hold beliefs that are consistent and coherent. On a practical level, the agent is capable of intending: this activity brings about the state of affairs that he desires. Rationality urges the agent to hold intentions consistently with the set of beliefs that he is accepting. Practical rationality in particular demands the agent to respect the consistency and coherence requirements for intentions. In the following paper I am going to explore and criticize cognitivism about practical reason, one of the most disputed position in action theory. Cognitivists claim that we can make sense of the rational requirements for consistency and coherence of intentions by appealing exclusively to the requirements of consistency and coherence of beliefs. Practical rationality is in some sense reducible to theoretical rationality. I will explore this claim and assess whether this is an acceptable possibility. And of course, I will point out that there is space for some criticism.