This paper analyses the financial and war-spending policies of a state that faces a conflict in which defeat would result in the loss of sovereign power and in which the material consequences, conditional on avoiding defeat, are stochastic. The analysis takes explicit account of the historical experiences of lenders, who face debt repudiation if the state to whom they have lent is defeated and who also face partial default if the material consequences of the war are unfavorable for the debtor state, even if it avoids defeat. In this analysis, the state uses war debt to smooth expected consumption intertemporally in response to temporary war spending, and the state also uses contingent debt servicing to insure realized consumption against the risk associated with the material consequences of the war. An important innovation in the analysis is to treat the equilibrium amount of war spending, the state's resulting probability of avoiding defeat, as well as the equilibrium amount of borrowing as a set of endogenous variables to be determined simultaneously.
