Severance pay and the accuracy of judgment

被引：0
|
作者：
Azetsu, Kenji [1 ]
Kumagai, Taro [1 ]
机构：
[1] Kobe Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2006年 / 10卷
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D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We show that the severance pay scheme can serve as bond and improve the welfare. When the authority appropriately adjudges the worker's effort, the increase in a severance payment reduces the shirker's expected benefit, so that the severance pay works as a bond, which is warranted by the authority.
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页数：8
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