INCENTIVE;
PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES;
DEA;
MORAL HAZARD;
D O I:
10.1287/mnsc.40.8.959
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号:
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
In this paper, we examine how empirical production frontiers may contribute to the incentives of production units. We consider a series of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) frontiers, and we show when these may be incentive efficient in the sense that they contain all the information that are relevant for optimal incentive provision. The frontiers considered include the so-called constant, decreasing and varying return to scale models, the free disposability and the free replicability models, as well as the increasing and decreasing return to scale models based on a relaxed set of assumptions. Also, we illustrate how to design optimal incentive schemes based on such frontiers.
机构:
Shandong Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Math & Quantitat Econ, Jinan 250014, Peoples R ChinaShandong Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Math & Quantitat Econ, Jinan 250014, Peoples R China
Shen, Wan-fang
Zhang, Da-qun
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机构:
Texas A&M Univ, Accounting Coll Business, Corpus Christi, TX 78412 USAShandong Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Math & Quantitat Econ, Jinan 250014, Peoples R China
Zhang, Da-qun
Liu, Wen-bin
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机构:
Univ Kent, Kent Business Sch, Canterbury CT2 7PE, Kent, EnglandShandong Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Math & Quantitat Econ, Jinan 250014, Peoples R China
Liu, Wen-bin
Yang, Guo-liang
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机构:
Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Policy & Management, Beijing 100190, Peoples R ChinaShandong Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Math & Quantitat Econ, Jinan 250014, Peoples R China