NORMS, PROCEDURES, AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

The overall thrust of the argument points in two opposite directions: it pleads for dimming the contrast commonly drawn between political philosophy and political science but calls for a more radical distinction between the activities of politics and of philosophy, and between its rationality and that of political mediation. Within the first strand of the argument, the fact value problem is re-examined, whilst within the second strand the central theme of the article-the operatively legitimizing source of political norms is viewed within a procedural locale that is recognizably democratic, in that its validation is a matter of opinion, of appraisal and reappraisal in and through civic activity itself, and not directly the work of extra-political doctrines that substantively predetermine it. Although not thus preconditioned, procedural democracy is portrayed as being governed by a cognitive and institutional 'space' in which the 'conversion' of doctrinal 'isms' issues in 'performative principles, rather than a regime of pragmatic ad hocism.