HUTCHESON'S RELATION TO STOICISM IN THE LIGHT OF HIS MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Without questioning Hutcheson's general affinities with the Stoics, this article focuses on two important differences in moral psychology that show the limits of the appropriation of Stoicism in Hutcheson's ethics of benevolence. First, Hutcheson's distinction between calm affections and violent passions does not fully match with the Stoic distinction between constanti and perturbationes, since the emotion of sorrow remains in Hutcheson's table of the calm affections. As far as sorrow as a public affection is concerned, this first point is tied to a second point, which Hutcheson highlights himself: His conception of virtue as benevolence and the general importance of the public affections seem to be in conflict with a Stoic conception of virtue as an internal good, since the happiness of others, which is the object of both Hutchesonian benevolence and the public sense, is external for the Stoics.