DISCUSSION OF A LABORATORY INVESTIGATION OF THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

被引：1

|

作者：

YOUNG, SM

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来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 1985年 / 23卷

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D O I：

10.2307/2490692

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

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页码：121 / 123

页数：3

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