Cooperation in a common pool resource game: Strategic behavior and a sense of intimacy

被引:0
|
作者
Kumakawa, Takehisa [1 ]
机构
[1] Nagoya Inst Technol, Creat Engn Educ Ctr, Showa Ku, Gokiso Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4668555, Japan
来源
COGENT ECONOMICS & FINANCE | 2018年 / 6卷 / 01期
基金
日本学术振兴会;
关键词
common pool resources; cooperation; strategic behavior; sense of intimacy;
D O I
10.1080/23322039.2018.1446654
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study experimentally investigates two possible reasons for cooperative investment decisions in common pool resource games with two players. One reason is strategic behavior: subjects, who are allowed to interact with their partners repeatedly, attempt to build a long-term relationship and elicit cooperation from their partners. Another reason is a sense of intimacy: as the pairings of subjects are fixed throughout the experiment, subjects develop a sense of intimacy with their partners and make decisions by considering their benefit. The results suggest that cooperative decisions can be explained almost solely by subjects' strategic behaviors; however, the hypothesis that a sense of intimacy governed cooperative investment was not supported.
引用
收藏
页数:7
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