COSTS OF MONITORING AND CORPORATE-TAXATION

被引:12
|
作者
KANNIAINEN, V
SODERSTEN, J
机构
[1] UNIV UPPSALA,DEPT ECON,BOX 513,S-75120 UPPSALA,SWEDEN
[2] UNIV HELSINKI,DEPT ECON,SF-00100 HELSINKI 10,FINLAND
关键词
CORPORATE TAXATION; MONITORING COSTS; INVESTMENT INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90056-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A new approach to understanding the real effects of corporate taxation is suggested. Essentially, by claiming that corporate debt means discipline for the executives, the debt policy of a firm is endogenised. It is then proved that the effective profits tax rate is tied to current and expected future profitability, reflected in the marginal valuation of equity. A theoretically correct effective marginal profits tax rate cannot be estimated from historical figures. Moreover, a new tax neutrality result in suggested. For the first time, the paper provides a choice-theoretical explanation for corporations in the Nordic countries having quite systematically chosen to abstain from maximising their interest-free tax debt capacity.
引用
收藏
页码:307 / 321
页数:15
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