Preempting Principles: Recent Debates in Moral Particularism

被引:3
|
作者
McKeever, Sean [1 ]
Ridge, Michael [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Davidson Coll, Philosophy, Davidson, NC 28035 USA
[2] Univ Edinburgh, Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh, Midlothian, Scotland
[3] Dugald Stewart Bldg,3 Charles St, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, Midlothian, Scotland
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00181.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Moral particularism, as recently defended, charges that traditional moral theorizing unduly privileges moral principles. Moral generalism defends a prominent place for moral principles. Because moral principles are often asked to play multiple roles, moral particularism aims at multiple targets. We distinguish two leading roles for moral principles, the role of standard and the role of guide. We critically survey some of the leading arguments both for and against principles so conceived.
引用
收藏
页码:1177 / 1192
页数:16
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