EXPERTS AGAINST ADVERSE SELECTION - A NOTE ON THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM WITH COSTLY APPROPRIABLE INFORMATION

被引：1

|

作者：

BIGELOW, JP

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1985年 / 37卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(85)90098-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

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页码：379 / 393

页数：15

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