Conference calls around merger and acquisition announcements: Do they reduce information asymmetry? UK Evidence

被引:6
|
作者
Siougle, Georgia [1 ]
Spyrou, Spyros I. [1 ]
Tsekrekos, Andrianos E. [1 ]
机构
[1] AUEB, Dept Accounting & Finance, 76 Patision Str, GR-10434 Athens, Greece
关键词
Mergers and acquisitions; Conference calls; Asymmetric information; Option markets; Corporate governance;
D O I
10.1016/j.ribaf.2013.07.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines conference call meetings held around merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements in the UK market. Our main findings indicate that conference calls not only facilitate the smoother transmission of M&A-related information in the stock market and smooth the rate of the information flow to the market, but also they reduce informed trading through option markets before M&A events. We also find that there is an inverse relation of analysts' forecast error and conference call probability, that firms initiate conference calls during M&As when their transactions are large and are facing liquidity constraints, and that the probability of a firm holding a conference call around an M&A is strongly and inversely related to the existence of traded equity options on its stock. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:148 / 172
页数:25
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