NUCLEAR STRATEGY - WHAT IS TRUE, WHAT IS FALSE, WHAT IS ARGUABLE

Because of the absence of evidence on bilateral nuclear war, or proof of the success of nuclear deterrence, speculative theory reigns supreme in debates over nuclear strategy. Bearing in mind the limitations of evidence (e.g., the historical record of arms control behavior is extensive, while it is nonexistent on the subject of whether or not a nuclear war would, or even could, be controlled), this article reviews the entire field of nuclear strategy in order to identify that which appears to be false, the sources of error, that which appears to be true, and major propositions whose merit is arguable. The article finds it is false to claim that nuclear deterrence is existential, that nuclear strategy is irrelevant to weapon choice and force size, or that nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy are “essentially irrelevant to international security.” Seven common sources of error behind arguments on nuclear strategy are discussed—these include the relative neglect of politics, psychology, history, and culture, and of differences among peacetime, crisistime, and wartime. The article finds that the prenuclear world is lost beyond retrieval, that there has to be nuclear strategy, that provision for the control of nuclear use is essential, that nuclear weapons are not instruments of military decision, and that nuclear deterrence has to be extended beyond the U.S. homeland. Finally, it is found that there is no generally persuasive case for or against the utility of active defenses, the value of arms control, or the importance of choosing one, rather than another, nuclear strategy. © 1990 Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.