Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness

被引：0
|
作者：
Dai, Meixing [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Strasbourg, BETA, Strasbourg, France
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2010年 / 30卷 / 03期
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D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative.
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页码：1720 / 1726
页数：7
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