This article surveys political development frameworks for analyzing the post-Communist transition to political democracy. Parallels with postcolonial events in Third World countries should caution against overoptimism about the prospects for mutually reinforcing economic and political development. In general, the study of Third World political development suggests that rapid regime transition with low mass participation is unlikely to result in sustainable democratic politics, especially where severe economic dislocations are present. High rates of participation during regime change may lead to rapid disillusionment with the performance of postrevolutionary government. It is thus argued that states wishing, for various reasons, to assist in smoothing the transition from communism should pay heed to the cautionary experience of Third World development assistance and monitor the political dimensions of the transformation, such as the stability of coalition governments, electoral turnout, ethnonationalism, as well as the orthodox economic indicators like inflation and rates of domestic investment. With respect to international assistance to the former Communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the article shows that the capacity of the Group of Twenty Four (G-24) donors to aid economic recovery is well below what is requested, or needed. Despite hosting a donor summit, the United States is taking a far less prominent role in the post-Cold War donor community than was the case in the analogous program for post-World War II recovery. This is having an impact on both volume and coordination of assistance. Finally, a strong, possibly ideological, preference among donors for finding private sector recipients for the bulk of assistance may erode the capacity of the post-Communist states to provide both infrastructure and political stability needed for investor confidence. Those making decisions about levels and modes of Western assistance should look beyond economic indicators of privatization as criteria for continued support and retain, where possible, political development objectives in both financial and project assistance. While we must not assume that the record of supporting democracy in Central and Eastern Europe will prove to be any better than in many Third World regimes, the greater security salience of Eastern Europe's stability adds urgency to the task of applying political development lessons to the post-Communist experience.
