Stock Option Backdating Bedlam

被引:0
|
作者
Ciesielski, Jack T. [1 ,2 ]
Weirich, Thomas R. [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Amer Inst Certified Publ Accountants, SEC Regulat Comm, New York, NY 10036 USA
[2] Financial Accounting Stand Board, Emerging Issues Task Force, Norwalk, CT 06856 USA
[3] Cent Michigan Univ, Mt Pleasant, MI 48859 USA
来源
关键词
D O I
10.1002/jcaf.20287
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Now that the dust has settled a bit, we take a closer look at the recent stock option backdating scandal. Stock option plans have usually been justified by saying they aligned management's interests with those of shareholders. But the authors point out that by backdating stock options, the board of directors weakens the bond between top management and shareholders. What caused this latest financial scandal? Was it one more example of unbridled executive greed? Or was it mostly sloppy recordkeeping? This article examines the issues, and the future implications for companies. (C) 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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页码:11 / 20
页数:10
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