SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

被引:2
|
作者
Martin, Mathieu [1 ]
Salles, Maurice [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, F-95000 Cergy Pontoise, France
[2] Univ Caen, CREM, CNRS, Inst SCW,UMR 6211, F-14032 Caen, France
[3] London Sch Econ, CPNSS, London WC2A 2AB, England
[4] Bilgi Univ, Murat Sertel Ctr Adv Econ Studies, Istanbul, Turkey
关键词
Social choice; aggregation functions; voting games;
D O I
10.1142/S0219198913400124
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.
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页数:17
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