A SIMPLE MODEL OF REPRESSION AND REVOLT IN AUTOCRACIES APPLIED TO THE ARAB SPRING

The aim of this paper is to provide a specific point of view on the protests that have characterized the Arab countries from December 2010 and are still going on. To understand some of the reasons behind these events, I propose a sequential game with asymmetric information on the likelihood of having a successful uprising. This means that on one hand the government choices may signal the true state of nature and on the other hand the citizens' choices are a way to learn the truth. I assume specific parameters' values to obtain a full characterization of the set of equilibria. This allows to show the interaction of three main factors in determining the possible resulting political regimes: the country's wealth, the autocratic institutions and the general political mood. The complex interaction of these three variables explains why apparently heterogeneous countries may have similar political processes and apparently similar countries face different political situations.