THE PROSPECTS FOR CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

This paper considers the prospects for both limited and major conventional conflict on the Korean peninsula. The cases considered involve North Korea as the aggressor against the Combined Forces Command (CFC) of South Korea and the United States. With any conflict started by North Korea, a key issue would be the North Korean objectives. These cannot be determined with precision, given the character of the North Korean regime. But the likely objectives provide a framework for postulating North Korean strategy and operational concepts, and the North Korean assessment of whether these approaches could achieve its objectives. A major North Korean conventional attack is examined using both theater-level modeling and other forms of military assessment. Because of both CFC preparation and South Korean and US commitment, a North Korean major conventional attack appears very likely to fail: It does not appear capable of penetrating the forward CFC ground defenses, and even if it could, CFC air forces could stop a North Korean advance well short of its objectives. Overcoming these CFC strengths would require the use of weapons of far more lethality, such as chemical and perhaps biological weapons (in addition to conventional weapons), though their use raises other problems for North Korea. The prospects for success of even this alternative are uncertain and the risk so great that such a conflict is unlikely to develop as a purposeful North Korean effort at expansion, but cannot be ruled out as a North Korean act of desperation. It is also possible that some form of limited conflict could occur either as an isolated event or as a precursor to a major conflict in Korea. Such attacks could occur in various circumstances, such as a North Korean response to some form of sanctions that may yet occur if it becomes recalcitrant on the nuclear weapon issue. The costs of even a limited conflict could be very high. The CFC must carefully evaluate the kinds of limited attacks that North Korea could commit, and determine appropriate responses that avoid: (1) encouraging further North Korean attacks and (2) overreacting to North Korean provocation. Overreacting could lead to an escalation spiral that could plunge the Korean peninsula into a major war.