THE POLITICAL INCENTIVE EXPLANATION OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE - EVIDENCE FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

被引:22
|
作者
GEVA, N
DEROUEN, KR
MINTZ, A
机构
[1] Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College Station
关键词
DEMOCRATIC PEACE; POLITICS; EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH;
D O I
10.1080/03050629308434805
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
In this paper, we summarize a series of experimental studies that show that democracies don't fight each other because their leaders have very few political incentives to do so. The use of force against other democracies is perceived by the public and by leaders of democratic states as a failure of foreign policy. The reliance of democratic leaders on public support decreases therefore the likelihood of the use of force against other democracies.
引用
收藏
页码:215 / 229
页数:15
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