Lindahl prices solve the NIMBY problem

被引:0
|
作者
Laurent-Lucchetti, Jeremy [1 ,2 ]
Leroux, Justin [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bern, Dept Econ, Bern, Switzerland
[2] Univ Bern, Oeschger Ctr Climate Change, Bern, Switzerland
[3] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ, Canada
来源
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2010年 / 30卷 / 03期
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中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The siting of public facilities such as prisons or waste disposal facilities typically faces rejection by local populations (the "NIMBY" syndrome, for Not In My BackYard). These public goods exhibit a private bad aspect creating an asymmetry: all involved communities benefit from their existence, but only the host bears the local negative externality. We show that the well-known Lindahl pricing scheme constitutes the only cost-sharing method satisfying a set of properties specifically designed to handle the siting problem.
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页码:2457 / 2463
页数:7
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