Enforcement with Costly Group Formation

被引：0
|
作者：
Chatterjee, Prabirendra [1 ]
Sarangi, Sudipta [1 ]
机构：
[1] Louisiana State Univ, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2005年 / 15卷
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The joint liability literature claims that positive assortative matching, or risk homogeneity, is always the first best solution. We examine this claim in presence of group formation costs and find that the assertion is not always true.
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页数：8
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