RECIPROCITY AND THE INDUCTION OF COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS

Research in the 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma Game indicates that a tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy is most effective in inducing a subject to cooperate. In extending this to the N-person case, it was hypothesized that the larger the proportion of group members who use a reciprocal strategy, the greater the likelihood that other members will cooperate. Ss (college students) were asked to make choices in a public goods paradigm. Three experiments were conducted, varying group size (3, 5, and 9 persons) and the strategies used by simulated players (reciprocal or random). Results provide support for the basic reciprocity hypothesis and are interpreted in terms of (a) the properties of reciprocal TFT strategies described by Axelrod(1984), (b) Pruitt and Kimmel's(1977) goal-expectation hypothesis, and (c) Osgood's(1962) graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction (GRIT) strategy for reducing international tension.