STRATEGIC VOTING WITHOUT COLLUSION UNDER BINARY AND DEMOCRATIC GROUP DECISION RULES

被引：18

作者：

PATTANAIK, PK ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] DELHI SCH ECON,DELHI,INDIA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1975年 / 42卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2296823

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：93 / 103

页数：11

共 33 条

[1] STRATEGIC VOTING UNDER MINIMALLY BINARY GROUP DECISION FUNCTIONS
MACINTYRE, I
PATTANAIK, PK
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 25 (03) : 338 - 352
[2] EXISTENCE OF STABLE SITUATIONS, RESTRICTED PREFERENCES, AND STRATEGIC MANIPULATION UNDER DEMOCRATIC GROUP DECISION RULES
DUTTA, B
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1977, 15 (01) : 99 - 111
[3] THE EFFECT OF APPROVAL BALLOTING ON STRATEGIC VOTING UNDER ALTERNATIVE DECISION RULES
MERRILL, S
NAGEL, J
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1987, 81 (02) : 509 - 524
[4] Strategic voting under plurality and runoff rules
Niou, EMS
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS, 2001, 13 (02) : 209 - 227
[5] THREATS, COUNTERTHREATS AND STRATEGIC MANIPULATION FOR NON-BINARY GROUP DECISION RULES
BANDYOPADHYAY, T
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1982, 2 (02) : 145 - 155
[6] Welfare Effects of Strategic Voting Under Scoring Rules
Ianovski, Egor
Teplova, Daria
Kuka, Valeriia
MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS, EUMAS 2022, 2022, 13442 : 207 - 220
[7] Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules - An Experimental Analysis
Glassmann, Ulrich
Sauermann, Jan
POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT, 2011, 52 (03) : 373 - 398
[8] CONDITION FOR NASH-STABILITY UNDER BINARY AND DEMOCRATIC GROUP DECISION FUNCTIONS
SENGUPTA, M
DUTTA, B
THEORY AND DECISION, 1979, 10 (1-4) : 293 - 309
[9] Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
Bolle, Friedel
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS, 2018, 30 (04) : 477 - 488
[10] STABILITY OF SINCERE VOTING UNDER SOME CLASSES OF NON-BINARY GROUP DECISION PROCEDURES
PATTANAIK, PK
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 8 (02) : 206 - 224

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