Cost reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market

被引：0
|
作者：
Lin, Ming Hsin [1 ]
Ogawa, Hikaru [1 ]
机构：
[1] Nagoya Univ, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2005年 / 12卷
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中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This note studies the cost-reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. The result shows that while a profit-maximizing private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a social welfare-maximizing firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as long as the market share of the private firm is sufficiently large.
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