JUSTICE, FRIENDSHIP AND CARE - ARISTOTLE AND GILLIGAN - 2 OF A KIND

被引:3
|
作者
KOMTER, AE
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1177/135050689500200202
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Aristotle's and Carol Gilligan's ethics show several intriguing similarities. Both are founding morality in the concrete particularity and situatedness of human existence, rather than in abstract, universal moral principles. Both emphasize moral values such as friendship, care and responsibility, in addition to justice, rights and rules. Both value the affective and emotional foundations of morality, in addition to its more rational aspects. And, finally, both assume a relationship between gender and morality by associating disinterested behaviour, care and responsibility more with women than with men. However, these resemblances are only superficial. The reason is that in Aristotle's ethics, in contrast to Gilligan's, the following conceptual pairs are not considered as opposites, but as intrinsically related: universalism and particularism; justice and care; rationality and affectivity. Therefore, Aristotle's ethics may contribute significantly to contemporary debates about gender and morality.
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页码:151 / 169
页数:19
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