INCENTIVE CONTRACTING WITH HIDDEN CHOICES OF EFFORT AND RISK

被引:2
|
作者
ZOU, L
机构
[1] Department of Financial Management, FEE, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 1018 WB
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(94)00570-R
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We formalize an agency model where a firm's insiders choose both unobservable effort and risk, and identify conditions under which the insiders can commit to the first-best effort and risk levels while issuing securities under limited liability.
引用
收藏
页码:311 / 316
页数:6
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