SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR GENERALIZED MULTISTAGE GAMES WITHOUT SIDE PAYMENTS

被引：0
|
作者：
PECHERSKY, S
RUBINOV, A
机构：
[1] ACAD SCI AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC,INST MATH & MECH,F AGAEV STR 9,BAKU 370602,AZERBAIJAN
[2] ST PETERSBURG ECON & MATH INST,ST PETERSBURG,RUSSIA
来源：
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 1993年 / 22卷 / 05期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0304-4068(93)90033-H
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The generalized game without side payments is considered and interpreted as a set-valued map in R(n). Some concepts of the theory of superlinear maps developed for the economic dynamics problems are applied to define the solution of a game and its stable coalition (in the sense of this solution).
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页码：403 / 420
页数：18
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