Bypassing a Centralized State: The Case of the Greek Subnational Mobilization in the European Union

For over 25 years successive administrative reforms have taken place in Greece, with a view to modernizing the subnational institutions. The European pressures come across as an influential factor inducing the process of change. But what has been the subnational responsiveness related to the rationalization initiatives? The aim of this paper is to investigate the Greek subnational authorities' mobilization in the European arena, providing evidence of their bypassing the central state from a multi-level governance perspective. Building on the division between 'financial' and 'regulatory' mobilization, empirical data are drawn from the EU's environmental policy financial mechanism and the subnational representation and networking in Brussels. The figures show that only a few Greek subnational authorities financially mobilize; the vast majority show inertia. Moreover, their regulatory mobilization is hardly evident. It is argued that although the EU offers substantial incentives for mobilizing, domestic institutional capacity also accounts for much variation.